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Evolving Disclosure Practices and
Standards Affecting Tax-Exempt Bonds

Issued for the Nonprofit Health Care
Industry

ROBERT J. ZIMMERMAN*

DANIEL J. RIEKEN**

Within the securities markets generally a potential investor needs
to have a certain amount of accurate, specific information in order
to make an informed judgment about the nature of a security offered
for sale and the degree of credit and market risk associated with
purchasing the security. The investor's need for specifics about the
nature of a bond-for example, what repayment of principal and
payment of interest is promised on what dates under what conditions-is fairly obvious. Information relating to credit risk is impor-

tant so that the investor may evaluate the chances that the issuer of

the security may not keep its promise to pay as specified. The investor
evaluates market risk both by making his or her own judgment about
what the market will do in the future ... and by examining the rights
of action that the issuer of the security has reserved and might exercise
in response to market changes (for example, the right to call the
bonds at a pre-determined price before maturity or the right to refund

them).
All of the information which the issuer chooses (or may be

required) to provide or "disclose" to potential investors in any form
is known by the short-hand term "disclosure."'

* A.B., Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin (1970); J.D., Vanderbilt University
School of Law (1975); Partner, Foley & Lardner, Chicago, Illinois.
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1. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASSOCIATION MUNICIPAL SECURITIES DISCLOSURE TASK
FORCE REPORT: INITIAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, at i-ii
(June 1988) [hereinafter PSA Survey].
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INTRODUCTION

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Two of the principal federal statutes which regulate securities
transactions are the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"). 3 As a general rule,

with the notable exception of the antifraud provisions of both the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act, 4 securities issued by state and local
governments 5 and transactions in such securities are exempt from
federal regulation under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 6 Such

exemptions apply in situations in which the proceeds of the sale of

such securities are used directly by the state or local governmental

issuer for governmental purposes or are loaned or otherwise used or
made available to private, nonprofit corporations which own and

operate health care or health care-related facilities, such as hospitals,
nursing homes and residential facilities for the elderly or disabled. 7

2. See Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988).
3. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
4. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
5. Securities issued by state and local governments (hereinafter "municipal
securities") are generally bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness. Under
certain circumstances, interest received by the holder of such secuirities is excluded
from such holder's gross income and is therefore not subject to federal income
taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 103, 141-150 (1989).
6. "Any security issued or guaranteed ... by any State of the United States,
or by any political subdivision of a State . . . or by any public instrumentality of
one or more States . . . ." is an exempted security under Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988). "[Slecurities which are direct obligations of, or
obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, a State or any political
subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political
subdivision thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 78c(29) (1988) are exempted securities.
7. In certain transactions, the proceeds of the sale of municipal securities are
loaned or otherwise made available to a private, nonprofit corporation, which,
pursuant to an agreement with the issuer of the municipal securities, is obligated to
repay the loan. The state or local governmental issuer uses the proceeds of the loan
repayment to make principal and interest payments on the securities. In these
situations, the state or local governmental issuer is not obligated to use its own funds
or revenues to make payments on its securities, and the source of repayment is
generally limited to the funds provided by the nonprofit borrower. The securities
issued in these transactions are generally referred to as revenue bonds and the
transactions are sometimes referred to as conduit financings.
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Likewise, state securities laws generally exempt health facility
bonds from the registration requirements of such laws.' However,
health facility bonds and transactions therein are not exempt from
the antifraud provisions of such statutes. In certain states, exemption
from registration may require compliance with certain disclosure rules,
such as preparation and dissemination of disclosure documents or the
inclusion in such documents of certain required information. 9
Notwithstanding such federal and state exemptions, the antifraud
provisions of federal and state securities laws generally require adequate disclosure to the potential investor of the terms of the health
facility bonds offered for sale and a description of the facts and
circumstances associated with the ability of the issuer or user of the
proceeds of the sale of the health facility bonds to repay the debt
evidenced by the bonds. 0
In the context of the issuance and sale of health facility bonds,
the adequacy of the disclosure of such facts and circumstances depends
upon a variety of factors, including existing and prospective state and
federal laws and regulations, the purposes to which the proceeds of
the sale of the health facility bonds are applied, service area demographics, market share, medical staff characteristics, historical financial performance of the borrower and legal and practical constraints
imposed upon other sources of debt repayment, including guarantors
and issuers of credit enhancement, such as letters of credit and
municipal bond insurance. Because the health care industry and its
revenue sources and operating expenses are extensively regulated and
subject to political and social concerns, the degree of disclosure ought
to be relatively extensive.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since the mid-1970's the scope and degree of disclosure provided
in connection with the issuance and sale of municipal securities
generally has become an issue of growing concern." Attention was
8. Health facility bonds are municipal securities which are issued to benefit
private, nonprofit corporations which own and operate health care facilities. See,
e.g., UNIF. SEcuRITIEs ACT § 401(b)(1), 7B U.L.A. 82 (Supp. 1989). The original
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

has been adopted in whole or in part by 37 jurisdictions.

7B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989).

9. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
11. See Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, American Bar
Association, Disclosure Roles of Counsel in State and Local Government Securities
Offerings 2-3 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Disclosure Roles].
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focused on the disclosure practices of the municipal securities markets
in the 1970's as a consequence of several events. Among these were

the New York City financial crisis' 2 in which billions of dollars of
securities were sold by New York City with minimal disclosure; the
distribution in 1975 of a draft of the Municipal Finance Officers
Association's Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securities by
State and Local Governments'3 and the establishment by Congress of
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 14 which provides a quasigovernmental, regulatory mechanism for the activities of municipal
securities dealers and brokers. 5
Notwithstanding enhanced disclosure practices as a consequence
of the New York City crisis and the municipal securities industry's
reaction to it, recent events have resulted in renewed scrutiny of the
disclosure practices in the municipal securities markets. Concerns over
12. See id. at 2. Prior to 1975, New York City experienced a series of major
fiscal and budgetary problems and found it increasingly difficult to satisfy all of its
budgetary demands. Ultimately, this crisis led to a "moratorium" on payments on
municipal securities issued by New York City and the diversion of certain tax revenues
to the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York. See generally
Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 731,
358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (holding moratorium unconstitutional under
New York Constitution); Quirk v. Mun. Assistance Corp. of New York, 41 N.Y.2d
644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 394 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1977) (upholding diversion of certain tax
revenues).
13. See ABA Disclosure Roles, supra note 11, at 2; see also MUNICIPAL FINANCE

OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,

DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979). As a consequence of the growing concern
over disclosure practices, the Municipal Finance Officers Association also issued
procedural statements and revised the disclosure guidelines during the 1970's. See
MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, PROCEDURAL STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND THE GUIDELINES FOR USE BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

IN

THE PREPARATION OF YEARLY INFORMATION STATEMENTS AND OTHER CURRENT INFORMATION

(1978); FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR STATE

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979). The Municipal Finance Officers Association is
currently named the Government Finance Officers Association. ABA Disclosure
Roles, supra note 11, at 2.
14. See ABA Disclosure Roles, supra note 11, at 2. See generally Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (Supp. 1987)
15. In addition to these events, in 1976, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of
New Jersey introduced the Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976, S. 2969,
122 Cong. Rec. 3319-23 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1976), which would have required,
among other things, the preparation of annual reports and distribution documents
by the issuers of municipal securities. This legislation also defined the liabilities of
the various parties engaged in the issuance and distribution of municipal securities.
See id. at 3321-22.
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the adequacy of disclosure and the urgency of the responses to the
perceived disclosure deficiencies were initially caused by a substantial
payment default on bonds issued by the Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS),6 which was followed by the release in
September, 1988 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
of its report on the WPPSS default,17 and the investigation by the
SEC into certain "escrow transactions"'" in anticipation of the effectiveness of certain changes in federal income tax laws.' 9 Consequently, the Government Finance Officer's Association (GFOA) revised
its Disclosure Guidelines, 20 and the Public Securities Association con16. There was a substantial failure by WPPSS to pay principal and interest on
certain of its bonds issued to finance construction of two nuclear power plants. For
a complete discussion of issues raised by the WPPSS default and a compilation of
cases, orders and other matters related thereto, see R. Doty, Life After WPPSS:
Issuer Disclosure in the State and Local Government Securities Market (1988)
[hereinafter Life After WPPSS].
17. SEcuaTrs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Staff Report on the Investigation
in the Matter of Transactions in Washington Public Power Supply System Securities

(September 1988) [hereinafter SEC WPPSS Report]. "The WPPSS Report focused
on four primary areas of perceived deficient disclosure: (1) project budget and cost
information; (2) availability of financing sources; (3) power needs in the region; and
(4) the level of commitment of the WPPSS participants to the financings and the

overall program." Gardner & Doty, The Revolution in State and Local Government
Security Disclose Practice, 2 INsIGHTs - THE CORP. & SEC. Law Advisor (1988)
[hereinafter INSIGHTS]. In each area, it was found that WPPSS failed to provide

sufficient disclosure of potential and existing problems, even when relevant information was known to WPPSS the underwriters of the WPPSS bonds, the financial
advisor to WPPSS, engineers, various counsel and project participants. Id. "The
staff concluded that there was unwarranted reliance on information provided, and
representations made, by the issuer, without independent verification." Id.

See generally Life After WPPSS, supra note 16.
18. See Most Escrow Deals in Probe Produced No Construction, The Bond
Buyer, Feb. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 3-4; Some Black Box Deals May Have Disclosure,

Tax Law Problems, The Bond Buyer, Feb. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 4. In an escrow
transaction, the proceeds of the sale of municipal securities are deposited with a
bond trustee or other fiduciary and are invested for a period of time until such
proceeds are needed to fund the project for which the securities were issued. In many
transactions subject to SEC investigation, the project was never commenced or the
proceeds were invested for an unusually lengthy duration. See Most Escrow Deals in
Probe Produced No Construction, The Bond Buyer, Feb. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 3; 18,
col. 1-3.
19. See generally, C. OLSON, F. BALLARD, JR., F. STICHNOTH, L. SCHACEL,
STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING, chs. 5-7 (1988) [hereinafter OLsON]
(regarding recent changes in federal income tax law affecting municipal securities).

20.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR
(January 1988) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
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ducted a survey and analysis of current disclosure practices. 21
In conjunction with its WPPSS Report, the SEC proposed for
comment and later promulgated Rule 15c2-122 2 which requires that,
under certain circumstances, underwriters participating in offerings of
municipal securities review and distribute disclosure documents pertaining to such securities. In addition, several states have revised their
securities laws affecting disclosure and registration requirements 23 and
recent cases appear to have extended the application of certain theories
such as the "fraud-on-the market" theory, 24 which effectively lessen
the burden of proof of a plaintiff in a securities fraud case.
Through these developments and through statutory requirements
that all material information concerning the issuance and sale of
municipal securities be disclosed, the practice of "voluntary" disclosure ostensibly in compliance with general antifraud standards appears
to be giving way to the institution of a mandatory disclosure system
in the municipal "securities market based on the antifraud provisions
of federal and state securities law and common law, as well as SEC
rulemaking. 25 This movement toward a mandatory disclosure system,
together with an increasing number of defaults of health facility
bonds 26 and the general concern regarding the credit-worthiness of
The Disclosure Guidelines also incorporate the previously issued procedural statements. See id. See also supra note 13. To fill a perceived void in the
Disclosure Guidelines' treatment of conduit issues, see supra note 7, "the National
Federation of Municipal Analysts announced in April 1988 the formation of a task
force to prepare its own set of disclosure guidelines." INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 8.
21. See PSA Survey, supra note 1.
22. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26985, [Final
Rule] [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (June 10, 1989)
[hereinafter Release No. 34-26985], 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12; Municipal Securities
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26100, [Proposed Rule] [Securities Exchange
Act of 19341 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed
Sept. 28, 1988) [hereinafter Release No. 261001.
23. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
24. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S.Ct. 978 (1988); Ross v. Bank South,
837 F.2d 980 (lth Cir. 1988); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
25. INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 3.
26. According to incomplete data compiled by the Bond Investors Association,
Miami Lakes, Florida, "tax-exempt healthcare bond issues on which borrowers
defaulted in 1988 represented 23.60'o of the volume of defaulted municipal bonds
recorded for the year," which represents an increase from 1987. HealthcareAccounts
for 23% of Municipal Bond Defaults, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 10, 1989, at 44.
See also Letter from Jeffrey L. Esser, Executive Director, GFOA to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, SEC (January 12, 1989), particularly note 14 therein.
GUIDELINES].
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health care borrowers, 27 mandates careful consideration of the adequacy of disclosure in connection with the issuance and sale of health
facility bonds.
II.

ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS

While the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act 2 and the 1934
vary somewhat from the antifraud provisions of the various
Act
29

states' securities laws, both the federal and state antifraud provisions
require full disclosure of material information concerning offerings
of securities and prohibit misrepresentation or other fraudulent practices, with the objective of protecting investors and providing an
opportunity for investors to make informed decisions in connection
with the purchase of securities.30 At the federal level, these goals are
achieved with respect to municipal securities, including health facility
bonds, through Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,31 Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act3 2 and Rule lOb-5, 33 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, and at the state level through the adoption of laws based
upon the Uniform Securities Act 34 by a majority of the states.
A.

FEDERAL LAW

Although health facility bonds are expressly exempt from most

of the substantive provisions of the 1933 Act 35 and from the registra-

tion and reporting provisions of the 1934 Act, 3 6 the offer and sale of

27. In 1988, Standard & Poor's Corporation downgraded the ratings of 16
health facility bond issues that originally were rated A+ or better, compared with
nine such downgradings in 1987. Overall, there were 71 health facility bond issue
downgradings by Standard & Poor's in 1988 compared with 61 in 1987. Debt-rating

Erosion Spreads to Larger, A-rated Hospitals, MODERN
at 10.

HEALTHCARE,

Feb. 10, 1989,

28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1988). See supra note 37.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). See supra note 37.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITrES
REGULATION (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Loss]; JENNINGS AND M. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION (6th ed. 1987) [hereinafter JENNINGS AND MARSH]; Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 982 (1988) (and cases cited therein).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

34. See supra note 8.

35. See supra note 6.
36. Id. The original exemption afforded municipal securities was based, among
other things, upon the absence of abuses related to municipal securities and the fact
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health facility bonds are clearly subject to the antifraud provisions of
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.17 These antifraud provisions and
the "due diligence" standard therein3" provide the basis for and
delineate the scope of disclosure.
1. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies to the offer and sale of
municipal securities, including health facility bonds, 39 notwithstanding
the exemption of such securities from other provisions of the 1933
Act, and is directed at unlawful conduct of persons "in the offer or
sale of any securities." ' 40 The relevant portions of Section 17(a) state
that:
that purchasers of municipal securities were generally institutional investors with
expertise in financial and investment matters. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7 (1933); S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934); See generally
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S.Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before
the Committee on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (Hearings S.
Res. 84, S.Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). Compare OLSON, supra note 19, at § 8:21
(John E. Petersen of the Government Finance Research Center, Washington, D.C.,
Household Sector as Investors in Tax-Exempt Securities, in his analysis indicates that
lower and middle income individuals purchase municipal bonds through sophisticated
managers of mutual funds); with Pryde, IRS Data Show Tax-Exempts Held by People
of All Incomes, The Bond Buyer, Jan. 17, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (middle and lower
income households hold a significant percentage of outstanding municipal bonds).
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (1988). As a general proposition, the antifraud
provisions are included in Sections 11, 12(2) and 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 771, 77q (1988), Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), and
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act. Municipal securities, including health facility bonds, are not subject to Sections
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, which apply to securities registered under Section 5 of
the 1933 Act and to registration statements and prospectuses with respect to such
securities. However, the "due diligence" defense described in these sections, which
is available to certain parties in actions brought thereunder, have traditionally been
considered when delineating the disclosure obligations of the various parties to a
transaction involving the offer and sale of health facility bonds. Under the "due
diligence" defense of Section 11 of the 1933 Act, a party may avoid liability if such
party affirmatively shows that "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe, and did believe ... that the statements [in the registration
statement] were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading
.... 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1988). The "due diligence" standard as set forth
in such actions involving health facility bonds is the basis of preparing official
statements and other offering material.
38. See supra note 37.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1988).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
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It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities . . . directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact

or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading .... 4,

In Aaron v. SEC0 2 the Supreme Court held that actions brought by
the SEC under Section 17(a)(1) require a showing of "scienter," or
knowing or intentional misconduct, whereas actions brought under
Section 17(a)(2) do not require a showing of scienter but rather
negligence. 43 While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to address

the question," it is doubtful that a private cause of action exists under
Section 17(a), 45 thereby leaving enforcement of Section 17(a) to the
SEC.

46

41. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)-(2) (1988).

42. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
43. See id. at 697.

44. The Supreme Court in Aaron stated that, "[ajlthough this Court has
repeatedly assumed the existence of an implied cause of action under § 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 . . . it has not had occasion to address the question whether a private
cause of action exists under § 17(a)." 446 U.S. 680, 689 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975)). See generally Loss, supra note
30, at 975-81.
45. In the absence of direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts were in
conflict concerning the issue. Compare Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, 561 F.2d 152
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (denying a private cause of action
under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act) with Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604
F.2d 1038 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing a cause of action under the Antifraud
Provision). However, the Supreme Court has recently begun a trend away from
implied causes of action. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (18 U.S.C. § 3610 did
not give a stockholder an implied cause of action against corporation for advertising
contributions in presidential campaign); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979) (Section 17(a) does not imply a private cause of action for damages).
Following the trend of the Supreme Court in Cort and Redington, lower courts are
finding no implied private cause of action under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See
Washington Public Power Supply System v. Houghton, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987)
(reversing a prior decision); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (overruling its earlier decision permitting a private cause of action).
46. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Senex Corp.,
399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1976). The
promulgation of Rule 15c2-12 may indicate a stronger tendency for future SEC
enforcement actions.
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In addition to actions against parties for primary violations of
Section 17(a), courts have extended liability for violations of Section
17(a) to those who are not directly involved in securities transactions
such as attorneys and accountants 47 based on an "aiding and abetting"
theory.4 8 Although specific conduct of attorneys has been prohibited
by courts through actions based on an aiding and abetting theory, the
scope of an attorney's duty as it relates to violations of securities laws
49
has not been established.
2.

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule JOb-5

In contrast to Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act which supports
actions only against sellers of securities, 0 Section 10(b) of the 1934
47. See generally NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF BOND LAWYERS, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MuIiNcAL BOND LAW 573-82 (1988) [hereinafter NABL FUNDAMENTALS].
48. An aiding and abetting theory has been used to extend liability for primary

violations under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Generally, a three-part test is applied, by which
"a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a primary violation, (2) the defendant's
knowledge that his activity was improper and (3) substantial assistance provide by
the defendant to the primary violation." NABL FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 47, at
574. See Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 n.8 (11th Cir.), reh'g. denied
en blanc, 772 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985) (and cases cited therein). See also Harmsen
v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982); ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d
Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy
v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).

49. See NABL

FUNDAMENTALS,

supra note 47, at 575-79; SEC v. Frank, 388

F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (SEC obtained injunction against defendant attorney for his

participation in the preparation of a misleading offering circular); SEC v. Spectrum,
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (court held that defendant attorney could be held liable
for use of his opinion letter in fraudulent scheme); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma
Development Authority, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that bond counsel

could be liable as primary violator or an aider and abetter by knowingly aiding an
underwriter in the issuance of value-depleted bonds); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d

770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985) (attorney can be liable for issuing an opinion "without a
genuine belief or reasonable basis"). SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402

F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975) (defendant attorney's opinion letters which falsely

reflected sale of a subsidiary were relied upon in preparation of financial statements);
97,156 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
But see SEC v. Haswell, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(holding that defendant attorney's conduct did not evidence sufficient scienter to

impose Rule lOb-5 liability); Ross v. Rice, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,948 (N.D.
Ala. 1986) (holding that bond counsel did not aid and abet securities fraud); Barker
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Note,
Secondary Liability of Attorneys for Securities Violations-The Need for a Single
Standard of Attorney Conduct, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 65 (1983).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1988). See supra text accompanying note 40.
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Act" and Rule lOb-5,52 promulgated in furtherance of Section 10(b)'s
3
objectives, apply to the conduct of both sellers and purchasers.
Section 10(b), in relevant part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, .
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate4 in the public interest or for the protection of

investors

In order to implement Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule
lOb-5, which includes language virtually identical to Section 17(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act. 5 The relevant language of Rule lOb-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, .
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading,6 ... in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
However, while Section 17(a) prohibits conduct in connection with
the "offer or sale"5 7 of securities, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
8
prohibit conduct in connection with an actual sale of a security.
In 1971, the Supreme Court resolved a much debated issue by
acknowledging that an implied private cause of action can be established under Section 10(b), 5 9 and recently stated further that, "a
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

53. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687 (1980). In addition, a plaintiff under
Rule lOb-5 must be an actual buyer or seller at the time that the fraud occurred. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-49 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952), reh'g. denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1988).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
59. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). See generally Loss, supra note 30, at 924-88.
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private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-

5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's

requirements. '" 60 However, in contrast to the negligence standard

applicable to actions under Section 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 61 the
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder62 held that to be

culpable under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 a defendant must have
acted with "scienter, ' 6s defined as "a mental state embracing intent

to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 64 The Court in Hochfelder
declined to address whether recklessness would constitute scienter; 65
"however, circuit courts which have addressed the issue have held
that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement."66 As with liability

under Section 17(a), the courts have extended liability for violations
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to individuals who are not directly
involved in securities transactions, based on an aiding and abetting
theory.

67

"Actions under 10(b) and Rule lob-5 are distinct from common
law deceit and misrepresentation claims [citation omitted] and are in
part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the

common law." ' 68 However, when courts began recognizing an implied
private cause of action, plaintiffs were required to prove the common

law fraud 69 elements including "a misstatement or omission of a

material fact"; "an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud the
plaintiff"; reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's misstatement
or omission; and "damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
plaintiff's reliance." '70 As case law has developed, "courts have modified some of these elements. ' 71
60. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988). See generally
and MARSH, supra note 30, at 832-900.
61. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); See also supra text accompanying
notes 42-46.
62. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
63. Id. at 201.
64. Id.at 194, n.12.
65. See id.at 215.
66. See NABL FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 47, at 562 n.83 (and the cases cited
therein).
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68. See Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S.Ct. 978, 990 n.22 (1988) (citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983)).
69. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
JENNINGS

70. NABL

FUNDAMENTALS,

supra note 47, at 555.

71. Id.For an excellent compilation and summary of cases, see generally R.
Dory & J. BATES, JR., THE FEDERAL LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE, Parts B and D (1988).
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Materiality

The duty of disclosure under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 applies
with respect to "material" facts. Therefore, to be actionable, a
misstatement or omission must pertain to a "material" fact. As the
applicable standard of materiality has developed, the Supreme Court
"was careful not to set too low a standard ' 72 so that it might "bring

an overabundance of information within its reach

. . . .

"-7

The Su-

preme Court has defined the necessary materiality standard as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
.... Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
74
'total mix' of information made available.

Broadly stated then, information pertaining to a security or the issuer
thereof is considered material if there is a substantial likelihood that
such information, or the absence thereof, would affect the investment
decision of a reasonable investor. 7 The materiality standard is applied
consistently, whether the basis or objective of the investment is
speculative or conservative. 76 Full disclosure of material information
will adequately describe the essential terms of the securities, such as
payment and prepayment provisions and security for the obligation,
and the ability of the issuer or the conduit borrower 77 to repay the
obligation.
The disclosure obligation of necessity encompasses material adverse facts and circumstances affecting or potentially affecting the
ability of the borrower to discharge the obligations underlying the
security.
Applying the materiality standard to the sale of health facility
bonds generally requires disclosure of all factors affecting the ability
72. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988).
73. Id.
74. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (action

under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act). The standard for materiality recited in TSC
Industries was expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic as the "standard of
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 context. 108 S.Ct. 978, 983 (1988). For a
thorough discussion of the development and application of this standard, see Loss,
supra note 30, at 718-23.
75. See generally Loss, supra note 30, at 718-23.
76. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
77. See supra note 7.
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of the borrower to generate sufficient revenues and control expenses
to the extent necessary to provide funds to discharge the repayment
obligation. Certain factors may be subject to control of management
whereas others may not. Factors outside management control include
those subject to applicable laws, changes in law and the characteristics
of the community served by the borrower. The ability to generate
revenues is favorably affected by certain operational and staffing
characteristics, such as market dominance in certain services, favorable demographic data indicating potentially increasing inpatient admissions or a relatively wealthier service area population and a
relatively young medical staff. On the other hand, revenue generation
may be adversely affected by certain characteristics such as relatively
high management or medical staff turnover, a deteriorating economic
environment in the service area or governmental regulation of the
ability to expand services or renovate existing or construct new
physical facilities. The ability to control expenses may be adversely
affected by shortages of nursing or allied professional personnel, high
liability losses,. project cost overruns and regulatory requirements
affecting staffing patterns. In general, adverse facts and circumstances
may be attributable to factors within the general control of management of a specific borrower or to industry regulation generally, all of
which must be disclosed to the extent necessary to permit an informed
investment decision.
b.

Fraud on the Market Theory

As litigation under the antifraud provisions has developed and
courts have modified the various elements of a cause of action that a
plaintiff must satisfy, certain theories have developed which have
lessened the burden of proof of a plaintiff in a securities fraud case.
An example of this is the "fraud on the market" theory, which was
first adopted and clearly articulated in Blackie v. Barrack.7" The fraud
on the market theory has, in certain cases, eliminated the burden of
the plaintiff to prove reliance on the fraudulent misstatement or
omission 9 and has created a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 0
78. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).

79. See NABL

FUNDAMENTALS,

supra note 47, at 562-66 (and the cases cited

therein).
80. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990-91 (1988). The Court
in Basic, citing a previous case, stated that reliance is an element of a cause of action
under Rule lOb-5. 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)). In the lower court decision in Basic, the Sixth Circuit
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Recently, in stating that the presumption of reliance created by
the fraud on the market theory is consistent with congressional policy
embodied in the 1934 Act,81 the Supreme Court summarized the theory
as follows:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of
a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business ....
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements .... The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiff's purchase of stock in such a
case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on

misrepresentations .82

The Court stated that with the modern securities markets, in
which millions of securities change hands daily, requiring a plaintiff
to prove reliance by showing how the plaintiff would have acted if
omitted material information had been disclosed or if the misrepresentation had not been made would be an unrealistic burden in
litigation brought under Rule lOb-5. 3 The Court noted that "nearly
every court that has considered the proposition has concluded that
where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into
an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of
individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be

presumed.'

'84

Court of Appeals set forth five elements necessary under the fraud on the market

theory:
The plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendants made public misrepresentations, . . . (2) that the misrepresentations were material, . . . (3)
that the [security] was traded on an efficient market, . . . (4) that the
misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge
the value of the [security], . . . and (5) that the plaintiff traded in the

[security] between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time
the truth was revealed.

786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986).
81. Basic, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990-91 (1988).
82. Id. at 988-89 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speizer, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d
Cir. 1986)).
83. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989-90 (1988) (and the cases cited therein).
84. Basic, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991 (1988) (and the cases cited in n.25 therein). Cf.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. 978, 993 (1988) (Justice White's opinion dissenting from the

application of the fraud on the market theory).
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Essentially, the fraud on the market theory is premised on the
concept that the securities market accounts for all available material
information and that this is reflected in the price of the security in
an established market, thereby allowing investors to rely upon the
fairness of the market price rather than upon their own analysis of
the disclosure documents.85 "An investor who buys or sells stock at
the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that
price." ' s6 While rebuttable,8 7 the fraud on the market theory is the
basis of a judicially created presumption which allows the plaintiff to
avoid having to establish actual reliance on an alleged misstatement
or omission of a material fact in an action under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
B.

STATE LAW

All of the states have adopted laws containing antifraud provisions to regulate securities transactions as well as securities brokers
and dealers. The Uniform Securities Act88 has been adopted in various
forms by 37 states,89 and forms the basis for liability for actions
brought under such state securities laws. Section 501 of the Uniform
Securities Act9° is drafted in language very similar to Rule lOb-5

85. See NABL FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 47, at 563-64. Some courts have
extended the fraud on the market theory where "sham" transactions have been
alleged even though there was no established market for the new issue securities,
stating that the investors were entitled to assume that the market would produce
marketable securities rather than securities that could not be sold at any price if full
disclosure were made. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 103 U.S. 722 (1983) (plaintiff admitted never having read the offering circular
and that he purchased the bonds solely on the basis of his broker's recommendation);
Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Ross v. Bank South, 837
F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1988) (application of the fraud on the market theory where there
was no "sham" and class representatives admitted they would not have purchased
the securities had they read the risks disclosed in the disclosure document).
86. Basic, 108 S.Ct. 978, 992 (1988).
87. The Court in Basic stated that "[any showing that severs the link between
the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff,
or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the
presumption of reliance." 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988). The Court gave examples of
"severing the link," which may be accomplished by a showing that the misrepresentation did not lead to the distortion of price or that the plaintiff traded or would
have traded despite knowledge that the statement was false. Id.
88. See supra note 8.
89. Id. The remaining states have adopted their own unique statutes which
impose liabilities and set standards. Life After WPPSS, supra note 16, at 4.
90. UNIFORM SECURITiEs ACT § 501. Section 501 provides that:
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promulgated under the 1934 Act 91 and Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 92

Generally, the states' securities laws provide for exemptions from
registration of municipal securities, including health facility bonds,

but subject such securities to their antifraud provisions. However,
unlike Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 93 there is usually no exception
to the imposition of liabilities and standards for municipal securities.
Section 605 of the Uniform Securities Act 94 is drafted in language
very similar to that found in Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, but does

not exclude application to municipal securities.
The antifraud provisions of these various state securities laws
impose a duty to disclose in connection with the issuance or sale of
municipal securities, including health facility bonds. However, in
addition to actions which can be brought alleging violations of the
antifraud provisions of the state securities laws, plaintiffs may avail
themselves of various common law actions, including fraud and deceit
and negligent misrepresentation. 95
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES

A.

MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING BOARD

Although various legislation affecting the disclosure practices
affecting municipal securities has been proposed over the years since
the enactment of the 1933 Act 96 and the 1934 Act, 97 the first regulation
In connection with an offer to sell, or sale, offer to purchase, or purchase,
of a security, a person may not, directly or indirectly:
(1) employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made; or
(3) engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
94. UNIFORM SECURITES ACT § 605. In addition to language similar to Section
12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988), Section 605 of the Uniform Securities
Act adds an exception to the imposition of liability if the purchaser knew of the
misstatement or omission of the material fact. UNIFORM SEcURITIEs ACT § 605(b)(1).
95. See Loss, supra note 30, at 712-23 for a discussion of the common law
actions of deceit and negligent misrepresentation.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
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applicable to the municipal securities market occurred in 1975 with
the enactment of the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 (1975
Amendments).98 Pursuant to the 1975 Amendments, Congress established the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) which has
broad rulemaking authority which extends to brokers, dealers and
banks trading in municipal securities. 99 While the MSRB cannot
regulate issuers of municipal securities'0° and, therefore, the disclosure
documents of such issuers, the MSRB has promulgated Rule G-32
which requires the delivery by underwriters to their customers of
copies of a final official statement, if one is provided voluntarily by
the issuer, in connection with the sale of any new issue of municipal
securities. 011 The final official statement must be delivered no later
than at the time of settlement of the transaction; if no final official
statement will be prepared, then a notice to that effect must be
delivered.' 0 2 In addition to these requirements, if the new issue municipal securities were sold on a negotiated basis, Rule G-32 would
03
require the disclosure of certain underwriting arrangements. 1
Beyond these requirements of Rule G-32, there has been no
regulation at the federal level of disclosure practices in connection
with the issuance or sale of municipal securities. However, in reaction

98. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78(b),(c)
(1988)).
99. The 1975 Amendments require that MSRB rules:
be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with person engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in municipal securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market in municipal securities, and, in general, to protect investors
and the public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C) (1988).
100. Section 15B(d) of the 1934 Act, commonly known as the "Tower Amendment," prohibits both the SEC and the MSRB from requiring filings by issuers of
municipal securities, directly or indirectly through underwriters, prior to the sale of
such securities of "any application, report or document in connection with the
issuance, sale or distribution of such securities," and prohibits the MSRB from
adopting rules requiring an issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through
underwriters, to furnish prospective investors or the MSRB with any such materials;
provided, however, the MSRB may require underwriters to furnish such material
"which is generally available from a source other than such issuer." 15 U.S.C. §
78o-4(d)(1) and (2) (1988).
101. Rule G-32; MSRB Manual (CCH) 3656.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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to the recent WPPSS default,'4 increased pressure on the process of
disclosure in the municipal securities markets is evidenced by rules
regulating disclosure practices recently promulgated by the SEC, the
revised GFOA Disclosure Guidelines and recently enacted or proposed
amendments to various state securities laws.
B. RECENT SEC ACTIONS AND PROPOSALS

1. Rule 15c2-12
Reflecting concern about the current quality of disclosure in
connection with offerings of municipal securities, the SEC has promulgated Rule 15c2-12 which "is designed to prevent fraud by establishing standards for the procurement and dissemination by
underwriters of disclosure documents, thus enhancing the accuracy
and timeliness of disclosure to investors in large offerings of municipal
securities.' ' 15 The SEC believes that responsible review by underwriters of information provided by issuers of municipal securities, including health facility bonds, will encourage more accurate disclosure.'°6
Rule 15c2-12 has an effective date of January 1, 1990107 and will
require that underwriters participating in an offering of municipal
securities with'an aggregate principal amount of $1,000,000 or more:
(1) obtain and review a near final official statement prior to bidding
for or purchasing the municipal securities, and (2) contract with the
issuer of municipal securities to obtain copies of the final official
statement in sufficient time to permit the underwriter to provide the
final official statement to investors when confirmations requesting
payment are submitted to such investors, but in all events within
seven business days after any final agreement to purchase the municipal securities. 08 Additionally, Rule 15c2-12 will require that, upon
request by any potential investor, underwriters send a copy of any
preliminary or final official statement prepared by an issuer for
dissemination. 109
104. See supra note 16, and accompanying text.
105. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,782 (1988) (discussion of proposed rule 15c2-12) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12); see also Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at
37,782; Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22.
106. Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,782.
107. Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,799.
108. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,813 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c212(b)(1), (3)). See Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,802-28,806.
109. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(2)(4)). See Release No.
34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,804, 28,806.
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Rule 15c2-12 will require the preparation of a "final official
statement," which is defined as the "document or set of documents
prepared by the issuer of municipal securities or its representatives
seeting [sic] forth, among other matters, information concerning the
issuer(s) of such municipal securities and the proposed issue of
securities that is complete" as of its date of delivery." 0 Rule 15c2-12
will not directly require the issuer to prepare a final official statement.
However, by prohibiting any broker, dealer or municipal securities
dealer from purchasing an issue of securities exceeding the $1,000,000
threshold unless it contracts with the issuer to obtain a final official
statement after the purchase agreement is executed,"' the SEC will
indirectly require issuers of municipal securities exceeding the
$1,000,000 threshold to prepare an official statement. Rule 15c2-12
will require a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer to obtain
and review an official statement deemed "final" by the issuer prior
to agreeing to purchase the securities" 2 and, in negotiated underwritings, to provide to any potential investor, on request, any available
preliminary official statement." 3 An official statement deemed final
by the issuer is substantially the final official statement without certain
specific terms of the securities, such as offering price, interest rates,
identity of the underwriters, underwriter's compensation, the amount
of proceeds, delivery dates and ratings. 1 4 The intention of the obligation to obtain and review an official statement "deemed final" by
the issuer is to assist the underwriter in discharging its antifraud
obligations under federal securities laws." 5 This obligation should be
distinguished from the obligation to provide preliminary official state6
ments, if available, to potential investors."
Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(e)(3)).
111. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(3)).
112. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,813 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(1)).
113. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(2)). In a negotiated
underwriting, the underwriter is typically selected by the issuer to assist in developing
the structure of the securities transaction and consequently is involved in all significant
planning stages. An alternative category of underwriting is generically referred to as
a competitive offering, in which the issuer does not involve the underwriter in
planning the transaction. In a competitive offering, the underwriter or underwriting
group is selected on the basis of bids submitted to the issuer to underwrite the
proposed issue of securities.
114. Id.
115. See Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,803; and Release No. 26100,
supra note 22, at 37,779, 37,787.
116. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,813 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(2)).
The preliminary official statement appears to be similar to the "red herring" or
110.
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Rule 15c2-12 provides for limited exemptions for offerings of
municipal securities in denominations of.$100,000 which are sold to

no more than thirty-five persons which the underwriter considers to
be sophisticated investors purchasing the securities with investment
intent." 7 Additional exemptions are provided for offerings of munic-

ipal securities in denominations of $100,000 which have a maturity of
nine months or less" 8 or which may be tendered by the holder to the

issuer for redemption or purchase at least as frequently as every nine

months. 119 The Rule also provides for transactional exemptions upon
20
request.
For purposes of Rule 15c2-12, an issuer of municipal securities
is defined to include the governmental issuer of the securities and the
"issuer of any separate security" as defined in the 1934 Act.' 2' As a
consequence, in addition to the governmental issuer, the beneficiary
of an issue of health facility bonds, such as a not for profit health
care borrower, will have an obligation to determine when an official

preliminary prospectus used in transactions involving sales of registered securities.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1988). The SEC has noted that a preliminary official
statement may be substantially changed if necessary to assure "complete and accurate
disclosure," Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,783, n.44 and Release No. 3426985, supra note 22, at 28,803, and may need to be amended when key representations which are no longer accurate are made by the underwriter in the preliminary
official statement, thus acknowledging the primacy of full disclosure over a mechanical application of procedural rules.
117. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c)(1)). See Release No. 3426985, supra note 22, at 28,809. Exemption from registration is provided in the 1933
Act with respect to private placement of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1981);
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 to 230.506. Several commentators suggested that
the SEC consider a substantially similar private placement exemption. See Letter
from Paul S. Maco, Chairman, Special Committee on Securities Law and Disclosure,
National Association of Bond Lawyers to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (January
31, 1989) [hereinafter NABL Letter]; Letter from James H. Cheek, III, Chairman,
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law, American
Bar Association (ABA), Robert S. Amdursky, Chairman, Subcommittee on Municipal
and Government Obligations of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
Section of Business Law, ABA to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (January 26,
1989) [hereinafter ABA Letter]. But see Letter from Jeffrey L. Esser, Executive
Director, Government Finance Officers Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (January 12, 1989).
118. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,813 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c)(2)).
119. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c)(3)).
120. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)). The SEC does not expect
such exemptions to be "granted routinely." Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at
28,811.
121. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,813 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(e)(4)).
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statement is "final" for purposes of delivery to the underwriter and
to contract with the underwriter to provide official statements for
dissemination to potential investors. In addition, by defining the issuer
to include the issuer of a separate security, the issuer of credit
enhancement, such as a letter of credit, will also be considered the
22
issuer of securities for purposes of Rule 15c2-12.1
Rule 15c2-12 places substantial emphasis upon the mechanical
process of dissemination and does not attempt to delineate the scope
or contents of a final official statement. To that extent, achieving the
objective of Rule 15c2-12 of preventing fraud in municipal securities
transactions is questionable. Satisfaction of the dissemination requirements does not assure that the information so disseminated is correct.
The discharge of other legal duties associated with the sale of securities, including those of underwriters and issuers in discharging their
antifraud obligations, and regulatory and voluntary requirements and
standards must operate to provide the accuracy of information needed
to prevent fraud in municipal securities transactions.
Notwithstanding the absence of specific guidance, certain baseline
standards are suggested by the SEC. The SEC noted the increasing
complexity and diversity of municipal securities and a greater proportion of municipal securities which represent the credit of a "conduit
borrower"'' 23 and not the general obligation of the governmental
issuer, thus posing a "greater credit risk to investors.' ' 24 In addition,
the SEC suggested that Rule 15c2-12 will encourage "appropriate
disclosure of foreseeable risks and accurate descriptions" of the terms
of the securities,121 underscoring its concern with adequate disclosure
of both credit risks and the structure of a financing. The scope and
contents of the disclosure documents, including the official statement,
are dictated by the facts and circumstances of each issue of securities
and are generally determined by industry custom, appropriate or
required disclosure with respect to registered securities,126 state secu7
rities laws and voluntary guidelines.2
One possible effect of Rule 15c2-12 combined with evolving
voluntary disclosure guidelines such as the GFOA Guidelines, and
state securities law requirements, may be significant inconsistency of
122. See Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,807.
123. See supra note 7.
124. Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,779.
125. Id. at 37,782.
126. See generally Section 10 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988); Regulation
C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400 to 230.494.
127. See supra note 20; see also text accompanying note 145.
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disclosure and perhaps the development of an inefficient market for
municipal securities, particularly if marketing in certain states is
suspended because of timing concerns or perceived onerous state
disclosure requirements. In addition, issuers, underwriters and other
parties to municipal securities transactions may find it increasingly
difficult to furnish adequate disclosure without more specific and
consistent guidelines. Because of the increasing complexity of municipal securities and the need for greater consistency of disclosure in
the municipal securities markets, it may be appropriate, from a policy
perspective, to consider the imposition of a single set of disclosure
standards or guidelines under federal securities laws while maintaining
the exemption of such securities from the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. A central federal set of rules may be
preferable to a patchwork of federally-imposed dissemination requirements and divergent or inconsistent locally or voluntarily imposed
specific disclosure requirements.
2.

Central Repository

In an effort to improve the availability of disclosure to both the
primary and secondary municipal securities markets, the MSRB has
urged the SEC to create a central repository of official statements
and certain refunding documents prepared in connection with municipal securities.' 2 The MSRB proposal contemplated the mandatory
participation by municipal securities issuers in a central repository
and access to information filed in the repository granted to any
interested person for a fee. 129 The proposal has raised certain issues,
such as the implications of the Tower Amendment and the rulemaking
30
authority of the SEC under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Consideration of the proposal for a central repository serves to underscore
the heightened concern with disclosure and availability of information'
in the municipal securities markets.
128. Letter from James B.G. Hearty, Chairman, MSRB to David S. Ruder,
Chairman, SEC (December 17, 1987), reprinted in Life After WPPSS, supra note 16,
at Appendix XII-B.
129. Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,791.
130. See letter from James H. Cheek, III, Chairman, Committee on Federal
Regulation, and Robert S. Andursky, Chairman, Subcommittee on Municipal and
Governmental Obligations, American Bar Association, to David S. Ruder, Chairman,
SEC (March 30, 1988), reprinted in Life After WPPSS, supra note 16, at Appendix
XII-D.
131. A recent survey of municipal securities dealers revealed that 940o of the
respondents rated "content and completeness of disclosure documents" as "satisfac-
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Although the SEC has declined to impose a mandatory central
repository, 3 2 it has encouraged the development of such by the MSRB
and private enterprise. The MSRB has recently announced that it will
establish and maintain a central repository and may require underwriters to submit copies of final official statements to the repository.' 33
The SEC has also expressed encouragement toward the development
4
of repositories by private vendors. 31
3.

Municipal UnderwriterResponsibilities

The effectiveness of Rule 15c2-12 is based upon the central role
of an underwriter in the issuance of municipal securities. Because of
legal constraints imposed upon the SEC as a consequence of the
Tower Amendments,'35 the SEC is precluded from requiring issuers
of municipal securities to prepare and deliver specific disclosure
documents, including preliminary and final official statements. However, in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the antifraud
provisions of federal securities laws,13 6 the SEC is effectively precluding the issuance of such securities in excess of $1,000,000 unless a
final official statement is prepared and delivered and the underwriter
reviews the adequacy of the disclosure contained therein. 37
Inherent in the objective of Rule 15c2-12 to prevent fraud in
municipal securities transactions is the discharge by the underwriter
of its responsibilities under the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. Generally, the SEC articulates that an underwriter of
municipal securities has a responsibility to review the preliminary and
final official statement and, based upon such review, form a reasonable basis for belief in the "accuracy of key representations contained
in the [final] official statement." 3 ' By participating in the transaction,
the SEC emphasizes that the underwriter is making an "implied
tory" to "excellent." However, only 55% of the respondents rated "availability of
documents (preliminary and final) in a timely fashion" as "satisfactory" to "excellent." PSA Survey, supra note 1, at 12.
132. Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,811.
133. Letter from John W. Rowe, Chairman, MSRB, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC (June 1, 1989). See Release No. 34-26985, supra note 22, at 28,811
in which the SEC indicates its understanding that the MSRB will amend its rules to
require such deposits by underwriters.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; Release No. 34-26985, supra
note 22, at 28,811.
136. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
138. Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,779, 37,787.
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recommendation"' 3 9 concerning the securities and that the recommendation itself implies the formation of a reasonable basis for belief in
the truthfulness and completeness of key representations contained in
the preliminary and final official statement.
In order to form the reasonable basis, the SEC recognizes that
the "underwriter must exercise 'reasonable care' to evaluate 1the
40
accuracy of [the] statements made in the disclosure documents.
Typically, the underwriter and its counsel will undertake a "due
diligence" review of the affairs of the issuer and the private borrower
in a conduit financing transaction. 41 During this review, facts and
circumstances which relate to the ability of the issuer or the private
borrower in a conduit financing transaction to repay indebtedness
represented by the securities will become known and the underwriter
will be in a position to determine whether the final official statement
accurately discloses such facts and circumstances.
Concern was expressed that the emphasis of Rule 15c2-12 and
Release No. 26100 unduly places responsibility for disclosure upon
the underwriter rather than the issuer or other participants in the
transaction. 142 Notwithstanding such emphasis, the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws applicable to municipal securities issuers
and private borrowers in conduit financing transactions clearly place
upon the issuer and the private borrower the responsibility for disclosing all material facts relevant to the transaction, including the
ability of the issuer or private borrower to repay the indebtedness
evidenced by the security. 43 Release No. 26100 and Release No.
34-26985 are attempts to articulate the responsibility of the underwriter
as a participant in the transaction to undertake a review of the issuer
and, in a conduit transaction, of the private borrower, in order to
discharge the underwriter's obligations and enhance the efficient
market for the securities.
139. Id.

140. Id. at 37,788.

141. See supra note 7. The concept of a "due diligence" review arises out of
the investigation which an underwriter will undertake to determine whether the issuer
of registered securities has adequately disclosed all relevant facts and circumstances
and whether the standards articulated under general antifraud provisions of federal
securities laws have been satisfied. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
142. Other participants in the transaction may include a private entity, such as
a nonprofit health care borrower in a conduit transaction involving health facility
bonds and the issuers of credit enhancement, such as a municipal bond insurance
policy or a letter of credit. See generally NABL Letter and ABA Letter, supra note
117.
143. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. See Release No. 34-26985,
supra note 22, at 28,811.
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In addition, concern was expressed that the effect of Release No.
26100 may be to provide an additional basis for civil liability of
underwriters under the general antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. It has been suggested that a clearer distinction be made
between the standards by which the SEC will determine compliance
by underwriters with their federal antifraud obligations and the basis
of civil liability imposed upon underwriters under antifraud provisions. '44
D.

GFOA DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES

In the wake of the WPPSS default, the GFOA substantially
revised its Disclosure Guidelines 145 to reflect the increased and changing market demands on disclosure practices as well as the increased
complexity of structural features of and tax exemption for municipal
securities, particularly with respect to health facility bonds. 46 In its
introduction to the guidelines, the GFOA states that the guidelines
suggest inclusion of material that an investor "might" consider important in making an informed investment decision, with the overriding consideration of providing a complete, accurate and objective
144. The SEC indicated in Release No. 34-26985 that it had not created new
standards of liability and accurately reflects current practices. Release No. 34-26985,
supra note 22, at 28,811. Civil liability under Section 10(b)°of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981) requires a showing of "scienter" or knowing or intentional
misconduct or recklessness. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. The
formation of a "reasonable basis" for recommending the securities following the
exercise of "reasonable care" in investigating the issuer's affairs will imply a
negligence standard. See generally ABA Letter, supra note 117, and Letter from
Austin V. Koenen, Chairman, Municipal Securities Division of the Public Securities
Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (December 23, 1988).
145. See supra note 20.
146. For additional guidelines regarding disclosure in the municipal securities
market, see J. DALEY, A GuIDE To MUNIC'AL OFFICIAL STATEMENTS (1985). In
addition, the North American Securities Administrators Association has adopted
guidelines to "aid non-profit Health Care Facilities which wish to offer and sell NonProfit Health Care Facility Bonds." NASAA Reports (CCH) § 2001, at 1201. These
guidelines were designed to assist with disclosure in connection with securities exempt
pursuant to Section 3(a)(4) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (1988), rather than
Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988), but are nonetheless
helpful in suggesting information which may be material in an official statement
issued in connection with a conduit financing benefitting a nonprofit health care
facility. Id. The National Federation of Municipal Analysts also has released proposed
disclosure guidelines which are intended to improve the quality of disclosure material
and which suggest that specific items be disclosed. National Federation of Municipal
Analysts, Disclosure Guidelines (Draft dated May 3, 1989).
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description of those factors relating to the securities being 47offered
decision.

that are necessary to make an informed investment
The revised guidelines call for added emphasis on, among other
things, detailed disclosure of the terms of the state and local government securities offered, such as any optional, mandatory or extraordinary redemption or prepayment features, and the terms of any plan
of refunding, including the establishment of an escrow, the dates on
which principal of the refunded bonds is to be paid and any rights
reserved by the issuer to modify the terms of the escrow.

4

The

guidelines further state that the presence of credit enhancements, such
as bond insurance or letters or lines of credit, does not obviate the
applicability of the guidelines 49 and that, in addition to the other
suggested disclosure, the issuer should include disclosure regarding

50
the credit enhancement and the provider of the credit enhancement.

147. DISCLOSuRE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 17-18.
148. Id. at 26-27. In addition to redemption notice provisions suggested by the
GFOA, the SEC has proposed compliance with certain voluntary standards with
respect to municipal bond redemptions. See Municipal Bond Redemptions, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-23856, 37 SEC Docket 162 (December 3, 1986).
149. DIscLosuRE GUIDELINES, supra note 20.
150. Id. at 27. Concern has been expressed regarding the adequacy and consistency of disclosure with respect to credit enhancement for municipal securities, such
as municipal bond insurance policies and letters of credit. One commentator has
suggested that the SEC define "reasonable guidelines" delineating adequacy of
disclosure with respect to credit enhancement. See ABA Letter, supra note 117.
Another commentator has suggested that the standard practice of incorporating by
reference information filed with regulatory bodies describing the issuer of credit
enhancement is not adequate or acceptable and that investors should not be put to
the "expense, difficulty and delay frequently associated with obtaining the relevant
information" regarding the issuer of the credit enhancement from the source so
referenced. See Letter from Leon J. Karvelis, Jr., Chairman, and G. Keith Quinney,
Jr., Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the National Federation of
Municipal Analysts, to Johathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (January 19, 1989). On
the other hand, another commentator has noted that municipal bond insurers
"provide credit enhancement and not credit substitution" and that the presence or
absence of credit enhancement should not be a relevant factor in determining whether
or not an underwriter has exercised reasonable care in determining the truthfulness
of the issuer's key representations contained in the official statement. See Letter from
Philip R. Kastellec, Chairman, Disclosure Committee, Association of Financial
Guaranty Insurers, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (December 22, 1988). The
SEC initially indicated that the presence or absence of credit enhancement is a factor
in determining the underwriter's responsibilities for determining the accuracy of key
representations, Release No. 26100, supra note 22, at 37,789, but later withdrew its
emphasis on the credit enhancement factor, indicating that "the presence of credit
enhancements generally would not be a substitute for material disclosure concerning
the primary obligor .

. . ."

Release No. 34,26985, supra note 22, at 28,812.
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The GFOA suggests that an official statement should indicate on
the cover page and in the text that the information contained in the
official statement speaks only as of its date and that the information
is subject to change after such date.' Following from this is the need
of investors and dealers in the secondary market for current information on which to base investment decisions. To this end, the GFOA
has revised its Guidelinesfor the Timely Provision of Information on
a Continuing Basis52 and its Procedural Statements in Connection
with the Disclosure Guidelines"' which pc'ovide guidelines for the
production of documents to meet the need for current information in
the secondary market, 15 4 and which, among other things, suggest that
issuers submit documents to a public or private central repository.'55
While the GFOA states that the Disclosure Guidelines are not
intended to establish standards or create disclosure requirements or a
legal obligation to provide any or all of the suggested information,15 6
the guidelines are becoming a standard in the municipal securities
market. 5 7 Although the GFOA specifically states that its guidelines
"may not be appropriate for certain information in official statements
for offerings of obligations where the debt service on the securities is
dependent upon payments by a private entity,""'5 such as a nonprofit
health care entity with respect to an issue of health facility bonds, the
Disclosure Guidelines are relevant in assessing the materiality of
information and the need to include such information in an official
statement prepared in connection with a conduit financing transaction
benefitting a nonprofit health care borrower.
E.

STATE LAWS

Recent developments in state legislation regarding municipal securities also evidence the heightened concern with disclosure practices
in municipal securities markets. Certain proposals have served to
apply additional pressure on the process of disclosure in connection
with the issuance and sale of municipal securities. Interestingly, certain
151.
152.
153.
154.

DISCLOSURE
Id. at 57.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 20.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 20, at 20.

155. Id. at 91. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
156. Id.at 17.
157. See infra notes 163-164, and accompanying text for discussion of proposals
of certain states to adopt the GFOA Disclosure Guidelines as part of their securities
laws.
158. DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 19.
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proposals and legislation have been limited in application to the
disclosure practices in connection with conduit financing transactions.
Florida and New Jersey have both enacted legislation that eliminates the registration exemption for certain state and local government
securities if the issuer or guarantor of the securities is or has been in
default.5 9 The Florida registration requirement may be avoided by6°
compliance with disclosure requirements regarding the default.'
However, under New Jersey law the disclosure does not restore the
exemption from registration. An interpretation of the New Jersey
legislation by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities limits the application of the statute to defaults on securities backed by the same
6
credit.1 '
In Minnesota, an exemption from registration requirements for
62 Legislation was
conduit financing transactions no longer exists.
introduced in New York requiring compliance with the GFOA Disclosure Guidelines. However, this legislation was modified to apply to63
conduit financing transactions, but without specific disclosure rules.
The Texas Bond Review Board has issued administrative rules requiring that an "official statement or any other offering documents
prepared in connection with issuance of bonds approved by the board
must conform, to the extent feasible," to the GFOA Disclosure
Guidelines; the requirement applies only to bonds issued by Texas
state agencies. 64
IV.

CURRENT DISCLOSURE PRACTICE AND TRENDS IN THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY

Notwithstanding the absence of federal mandatory disclosure
standards as a consequence of the exemption from registration of
159. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(1) (Supp. 1989) (amended 1988); IA Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) § 17,105; N.J. STAT. § 49:3-50(a)(1) (Supp. 1989) (amended 1987); 2 Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 40,104.
160. See FLA. STAT. § 517.051(1) (Supp. 1989); Rule 3E-400.003; IA Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 17,433 (1988).
161. See Letter from Franklin L. Widmann, Bureau Regulatory Officer, State
of New Jersey Bureau of Securities, to Gary E. Walsh, Esq., dated December 23,
1987, reprinted in Life After WPPSS, supra note 16, at Appendix XIII-G.
162. MINN. STAT. § 8014.15.1 (Supp. 1989) (amended 1987); IA Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 33,115 (1986).
163. N.Y. Assembly Bill No. A.8100-D (June 3, 1987), reprinted in Life After
WPPSS, supra note 16, at Appendix XIII-B.
164. 181 Bond Review Board Rules § 181.6 (1988), reprinted in Life After
WPPSS, supra note 16, at Appendix XIII-F.
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health facility bonds, 65 issuers of such securities which have been
offered for public sale 166 generally have prepared or caused to be

prepared preliminary and final official statements which, to some

extent and to varying degrees, have conformed to custom and voluntary industry standards, including the Disclosure Guidelines 67 or
earlier versions thereof, 68 or have included information required to
be included in a prospectus with respect to registered securities. 69

However, the scope of disclosure and the contents of preliminary and

final official statements have been inconsistent. In addition, in recent
years, the scope and degree of disclosure with respect to health facility
bonds have altered significantly as a consequence of several factors,

including the availability of credit enhancement,
7'

70

the decline in

construction financing
and pressures upon the costs of issuing
municipal securities. 72 The altering scope and degree of disclosure

associated with such securities are perhaps reflected in a general
industry perception that the adequacy and contents of official state-

ments for health facility bonds are less satisfactory than for municipal
73
securities generally.
The alteration in the scope of disclosure does not necessarily
indicate failure to adhere to the general requirements of the antifraud

provisions of federal and state securities laws. However, as a conse-

165. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a general discussion of
offering documents associated with securities sold on the basis of a private placement
compared with a public sale.
167. See supra notes 20 and 145-158 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 13.
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.420-230.431. See also
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 and Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.
170. See supra note 150.
171. Financial feasibility studies are generally required by industry custom for
construction projects to be financed with the proceeds of the sale of health facility
bonds. See DISCLOsuRE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, Sections IV.B(4), (5).
172. The costs of issuing tax-exempt state and local government bonds that are
paid with the proceeds of such bonds cannot exceed two percent of the aggregate
face amount of the bond issue. I.R.C. § 147(g)(1) (1989).
173. The PSA Survey reveals that approximately 65% of the respondents to the
PSA questionnaires regard the content and completeness of official statements for
all new issues of state and local government securities to be "excellent" or "very
good" and approximately 5% regard such official statements as "less than satisfactory" or "poor." PSA Survey, supra note 1, at app. Table IA. With respect to
negotiated issues generally, 62.507o of the respondents characterized the adequacy of
disclosure practices as "excellent" or "very good" and 8.7% characterized such
practices as "less than satisfactory" or "poor." Id. Table 3A. With respect to health
facilities issues, the responses are 37.5% and 19.3%, respectively. Id. Table 8F.
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quence of developing concern about the credit-worthiness of the health
care industry, 71 4 changes in laws and regulations, or in the enforcement
thereof, affecting the industry generally'75 and the increased sensitivity
generally to the adequacy of disclosure, as evidenced by Rule 15c21216 and the disclosure guidelines,' 77 disclosure most likely will become
more extensive.
There are obviously facts and circumstances unique to each
individual nonprofit health care entity to which the proceeds of health
facility bonds are loaned and laws and regulations affecting the health
care industry generally which necessitate disclosure. As a general rule,
facts and circumstances and laws and regulations which are "material" must be disclosed in order to satisfy the issuer's and nonprofit
health care borrower's obligations under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act 17 and Rule lOb-5' 79 and to avoid civil liability thereunder. In
addition, the issuer and the nonprofit health care borrower should
expect increased pressure from the underwriter with respect to disclosure and "due diligence" review'8 0 in order to permit the underwriter
to discharge its obligations as described by the SEC in Release No.
34-26985. 11
174. See supra notes 26-27.
175. Certain federal legislation has had a significant effect upon the revenues of
general acute care hospitals. For example, as a consequence of the Social Security
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (April 20, 1983), general acute
care hospitals are paid for services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries on the basis of
standardized rates per discharge rather than on the basis of their costs of providing
such services. Although capital expenses associated with providing such care, such as
depreciation and interest, continue to be reimbursed at cost, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (December 22,
1987), reduced such payments to 85076 of such costs. Subsequent to October 1, 1991,
capital costs may no longer be reimbursed on a cost basis; a "capital component"
may be added to the standardized rates. Id. at § 4006(b)(1), 101 Stat. at 1330-52. In
addition, states have greater flexibility in developing reimbursement rates under the
Medicaid program as a consequence of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (September 3, 1982). Changes in federal
tax laws have restricted the ability of nonprofit hospitals to use the proceeds of taxexempt bonds, which may increase their cost of capital and has increased the risk of
default on tax-exempt bonds as a consequence of engaging in prohibited transactions.
See generally R. Zimmerman, Effect of Tax Reform Act of 1986 Upon Tax-Exempt

Bond Financing For the Health Care Industry, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 887 (1987).
176. See supra note 105.
177. See supra note 20.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).

179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
180. See supra note 141.
181. See supra note 22.

